



# Strategic Goal 10: Humanitarian Response

Minimize the Human Costs of Displacement, Conflicts, and Natural Disasters

#### I. Public Benefit

The United States commitment to humanitarian response demonstrates America's compassion for victims of armed conflict, landmines, forced migration, human rights violations, widespread health and food insecurity, and other threats. The strength of this commitment derives from both our common humanity and our responsibility as a global leader. When responding to natural and human-made disasters, the U.S. complements efforts to promote democracy and human rights. In addition to saving lives and alleviating human suffering, humanitarian programs support the objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy by addressing crises with potential regional (or even global) implications, fostering peace and stability, and promoting sustainable development and infrastructure revitalization.

Through the Department and USAID, the U.S. is the leader in international efforts to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises. It provides substantial resources and guidance through international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for worldwide humanitarian programs, with the objective of increasing access to protection, promoting burden-sharing, and coordinating funding and implementation strategies. The Department and USAID urge and participate in the multilateral response to humanitarian crises, and regularly monitor and evaluate humanitarian programs to ensure that the needs of refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and other conflict victims are met. Their financial support for demining activities makes areas safe for the return of refugees and IDPs. The Department's management and support of overseas refugee admissions programs provide an important durable solution for refugees, and serve as a leading model for other resettlement countries. USAID's leadership and humanitarian support to disasters and complex emergencies provides a positive standard for the donor community and hope for a better future for the people suffering as a result of natural or human-made disasters.

#### II. Resource Summary (\$ in Thousands)

	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	Change from FY 2005	
	Actual	Estimate	Request	Amount	%
Staff <sup>1</sup>	547	543	543	0	0%
Funds <sup>2</sup>	\$1,705,691	\$1,597,726	\$1,834,952	\$237,226	14.8%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Department of State direct-funded positions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Funds include both Department of State Appropriations Act Resources and Foreign Operations Resources, where applicable.



#### III. Strategic Goal Context

Shown below are the performance goals, initiatives/programs, and the resources, bureaus and partners that contribute to accomplishment of the "Humanitarian Response" strategic goal. Acronyms are defined in the glossary at the back of this publication.

Strategic Goal	Performance Goal (Short Title)	Initiative/ Program	Major Resources	Lead Bureau(s) <sup>1</sup>	Partners <sup>2</sup>
		Humanitarian Assistance	DA, ERMA, IDFA, MRA, TI, Title II	PRM, <i>DCHA</i>	UN agencies, HHS, other international and nongovernmental organizations
_	Assistance for Refugees, IDPs and Other Victims	Refugee Admissions to the United States	ERMA, MRA	PRM	DHS, HHS, UNHCR, IOM, NGOs
Humanitarian Response		Humanitarian Mine Action	NADR	PM, DCHA	DoD, NGOs, the UN and other international organizations and donor states
nitarian		World Food Program Donor Base	DA, D&CP, ERMA, IO&P, MRA, Title II	IO, PRM, DCHA/FFP	WFP, other WFP donors
Humai		Partner Accountability	ERMA, MRA	PRM	UNHCR, UNRWA, ICRC, IOM, other international and nongovernmental organizations
	Disaster Prevention and Response	Capacity Building	DA, IDFA, Title II	DCHA/OFDA	Famine Early Warning System, NOAA, USFS, USGS, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department, international and nongovernmental organizations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> USAID components are shown in blue italicized fonts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Selected acronyms are defined as follows: UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross; IOM: International Organization for Migration; WFP: World Food Program; NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.





### IV. Performance Summary

For each Initiative/Program that supports accomplishment of this strategic goal, the most critical FY 2006 performance indicators and targets are shown below.

#### Annual Performance Goal #1

EFFECTIVE PROTECTION, ASSISTANCE, AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, CONFLICT VICTIMS, AND VICTIMS OF NATURAL DISASTERS

		I/P #1: Humanitarian Assistance			
Addr	Address the humanitarian needs of refugees, victims of conflict and natural disasters, and Internally Displaced Persons.				
	Outcome Indicator				
		Indicator #1: Crude Mortality Rates (CMR) - Threshold			
TARGETS	FY 2006	<ol> <li>In complex humanitarian crises, CMR does not exceed regional emergency thresholds in 95% of targeted sites.</li> <li>Support efforts to improve data collection, e.g., expand pilot data collection effort to other countries and partner organizations, and to take other measures to address any problems of excess mortality.</li> </ol>			
TAR	FY 2005	<ol> <li>Complex humanitarian emergencies do not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people/day.</li> <li>Support efforts to improve data collection, e.g., expand pilot data collection effort to other countries and partner organizations, and to take other measures to address any problems of excess mortality.</li> </ol>			
	2004	<ol> <li>In June 2004, CMR exceeded 2/10,000 people per day among Sudanese refugees in Chad.</li> <li>With the Department's support, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters has created an online Complex Emergencies Database (CE-DAT) to track data on CMR and nutritional status.</li> </ol>			
RESULTS	2003	<ol> <li>Where data was available, crude mortality rates did not exceed 1/10,000 people per day in refugee crises.</li> <li>Efforts to expand pilot data collection were delayed; the Department's implementing partner was behind schedule and did not reach the pilot stage of the project, but finalized guidelines and methodology for CMR surveys.</li> </ol>			
RES	2002	Where data was available, crude mortality rates did not exceed 1/10,000 people per day in refugee crises. Efforts to expand pilot data collection were delayed; the Department's implementing partner was behind schedule and did not reach the pilot stage of the project, but finalized guidelines and methodology for CMR surveys.			
	2001	Refugee crises did not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people per day. Links established between the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and USAID to strengthen data collection.			
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The crude mortality rate is the mortality rate from all causes of death for a population. It is an accepted indicator of the extent to which the international community is meeting minimum standards of care (see <a href="www.sphereproject.org">www.sphereproject.org</a> ) and thus the overall impact and performance of the international relief system ( <a href="www.smartindicators.org">www.smartindicators.org</a> ). Criteria developed by UNHCR and SPHERE establish regional CMR thresholds for emergency response based on long-term CMR data in these areas.			
	Data Source	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED); UN Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations (NICS); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); reports from international and nongovernmental organizations. The global number of emergencies (for determining the denominator of target #2) will be established and regularly updated by triangulating information from various sources, including WHO/SCN, UNHCR, OCHA, ECHO, USAID/OFDA (declared disaster list).			



USAID				
ETS	FY 2006	In complex humanitarian crises, USAID will ensure (1) 65% of sites are monitored, and (2) the CMR declines or remains stable in two-thirds (2/3) of the monitored sites, for all of its funded projects.		
TARGETS	FY 2005	In complex humanitarian crises, USAID will ensure (1) 50% of sites are monitored, and (2) the CMR declines or remains stable in two-thirds (2/3) of the monitored sites, for all of its funded projects.		
RESULTS	2004	N/A		
RESL	2003-2001	N/A		
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The Crude Mortality Rate (CMR)* is the most vital, public health indicator of the severity of a humanitarian crisis. It is an accepted indicator of the extent to which the international community is meeting minimum standards of care (see www.sphereproject.org) and thus the overall impact and performance of the collective international relief system (www.smartindicators.org).  *The terminology Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) is similar to the term Crude Death Rate (CDR). The draft SMART Protocol proposes to revert to the terminology Crude Death Rate (CDR) to maintain consistency with the expression of Age Specific Death, where there has been considerable confusion.		
	Data Source	Complex Emergencies Database (CE-DAT) established by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), reports from international and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. The global number of emergencies (for determining the denominator) will be established and regularly updated by triangulating information from various sources, including WHO/SCN, UNHCR, OCHA, ECHO, USAID/OFDA (declared disaster list).		

	Outcome Indicator			
	Indicator #	3: Nutritional Status of Children Under 5 Years of Age - Threshold		
TARGETS	FY 2006	Nutritional status of children under five: In targeted sites, less than 10% of children under five suffer from global acute malnutrition.		
TAR	FY 2005	In complex humanitarian emergencies, less than 10% of children under five suffer from global acute malnutrition.		
2	2004	<ol> <li>In June 2004, 36-39% of children under age five suffered from global acute malnutrition among Sudanese refugees in Chad.</li> <li>The Department and USAID continued supporting new tools/measures to improve data collection and reporting on nutritional status.</li> </ol>		
RESULTS	2003	<u>Baseline</u> : In humanitarian crises where Department funds were provided, at least 90% of children under five had weight-for-height ratios that were greater than or equal to two standard deviations below the mean, or greater than 80% median weight-for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema.		
	2002-2001	N/A		
>-	Indicator Validation	If nutritional status is improving, this is a good indicator that humanitarian assistance programs are working (assuming other variables are constant).		
DATA QUALITY	Data Source	Complex Emergencies Database (CE-DAT) established by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED); UN Standing Committee on Nutrition/ Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations (NICS); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); reports from international and nongovernmental organizations. The global number of emergencies (for determining the denominator) will be established and regularly updated by triangulating information from various sources, including WHO/SCN, UNHCR, OCHA, ECHO, USAID/OFDA (declared disaster list).		





SUSAID S	Output Indicator			
	Indicator #4: Nutritional Status of Children Under 5 Years of Age - Trend			
TARGETS	FY 2006	In complex humanitarian crises, USAID will ensure (1) 65% of sites are monitored, and (2) nutritional status improves or remains stable in two-thirds (2/3) of the monitored sites, for all of its funded projects.		
TAR	FY 2005	In complex humanitarian emergencies, USAID will ensure (1) 50 % of sites are monitored, and (2) nutritional status improves or remains stable in two-thirds (2/3) of the monitored sites, for all of its funded projects.		
TS	2004	N/A		
RESULTS	2003	N/A		
~	2002-2001	N/A		
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Nutritional status is a basic indicator for assessing the severity of crisis, together with Crude Mortality Rate. In emergencies, weight loss among children 6-59 months is used as a proxy indicator for the general health and well being of the entire community. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) is the term used to include all malnourished children whether they have moderate wasting, severe wasting or edema, or some combination of these conditions. It is defined as weight-for-height ratios that are less than or equal to two standard deviations below the mean (Z score of less than -2), or less than eighty percent median weight-for-height, and the presence of nutritional edema.		
	Data Source	Complex Emergencies Database (CE-DAT) established by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED); UN Standing Committee on Nutrition/ Nutrition Information in Crisis Situations (NICS); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); reports from international and nongovernmental organizations. The global number of emergencies (for determining the denominator) will be established and regularly updated by triangulating information from various sources, including WHO/SCN, UNHCR, OCHA, ECHO, USAID/OFDA (declared disaster list).		

USAID	The state of the s			
MAL DEF	l	Indicator #5: Number of Beneficiaries Assisted by USAID		
SETS	FY 2006	<ol> <li>78,500,000 beneficiaries.</li> <li>14,711 beneficiaries who were torture survivors.</li> <li>Number of prosthetic devices distributed: 856</li> </ol>		
TARGETS	FY 2005	<ol> <li>90,000,000 beneficiaries.</li> <li>17,861 beneficiaries who were torture survivors.</li> <li>Number of prosthetic devices distributed: 988</li> </ol>		
TS	2004	<ol> <li>64,083,897 beneficiaries.</li> <li>14,881 beneficiaries who were torture survivors.</li> <li>Number of prosthetic devices distributed (baseline year): 707</li> </ol>		
RESULTS	2003	Baselines: 1. 73,010,637 beneficiaries. 2. 16,530 beneficiaries who were torture survivors.		
	2002-2001	N/A		
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	USAID provides assistance to millions of beneficiaries each year. This indicator will help capture total level of beneficiaries assisted by USAID.		
	Data Source	USAID Annual Reports from Operating Units, and Implementing Partner reports.		





#### **Efficiency Indicator**

Indicator #6: UNHCR Inventory Control: Value of Non-Expendable Items Procured/ Total Value of Recorded Non-Expendable Property Procured (PART Program: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

		<u> </u>
TARGETS	FY 2006	Tracking items procured worldwide (at headquarters and in the field), the ratio is 1.5:1
TAR	FY 2005	Tracking items procured at headquarters, the ratio is 1.5:1
	2004	<u>Target</u> : 2:1
RESULTS	2003	Actual: 1.8:1 (Ratio A:B, where A= \$38.7m and B= \$21.8m)
RESL	2002	Actual: 2.4:1 (Ratio A:B, where A= \$36.2m and B= \$14.8m)
	2001	Baseline: 2.1:1 (Ratio A:B, where A= \$24.9m and B= \$11.9m)
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator measures the efficiency of tracking the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) procurements through implementation of its Management Systems Renewal Project (MSRP).
	Data Source	UNHCR calendar year financial statements.

Explanation: The amount of new procurements recorded should equal the amount procured in any year. The procurement database at Headquarters is not linked to the asset tracking databases in 130 field offices, so data has to be manually entered twice - once as procured at HQ and again in the field. It is a time-consuming process that, too often, is not carried out in the field. MSRP will connect those databases, decreasing the amount of data that the field office is required to enter, thereby encouraging better performance.

Headquarters procures about 25% of all non-expendable items for the agency, much of which is deployed directly to the field. This indicator will be applied to headquarters procurement only until the MSRP is deployed to the field, which should be completed by the end of 2005. At that time, the indicator will be expanded to include UNHCR field office procurement (25% of total), as well as procurement done for UNHCR by implementing partners (approximately 50% of total procurements at present).

The measure is calculated as follows: "A" = FY HQ Non-Expendable Procurements

"B" = FY HQ Non-Expendable Inventory







#### **Efficiency Indicator**

Indicator #7: Reduction in Time Migrants From the Former Soviet Union Stay at Absorption Centers, Thereby Reducing Cost (PART Program: Humanitarian Migrants to Israel)

		,
TARGETS	FY 2006	2% reduction in average cost or \$2,340
	FY 2005	2% reduction in average cost or \$2,388
Z	2004	2% reduction in average cost or \$2,437.70
RESULTS	2003	Baseline: Average stay is 183.3 days or \$2,487.40
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Migrants' transition from absorption centers is an important step in achieving self-sufficiency and integration into Israeli society. Reduction in the amount of time spent in absorption centers represents efficiency in reaching this goal.
	Data Source	Twice-yearly reports from the United Israel Appeal, as well as reporting from the Department's staff monitoring visits.

# I/P #2: Refugee Admissions to the U.S. (PART Program)

Resettled refugees are received and initially assisted in appropriate ways, so that they can begin the process of becoming self-sufficient, fully integrated members of U.S. society.

	Output Indicator  Indicator #8: Refugees Resettled in the U.S., as a Percentage of the Ceiling		
47311	mulcato	i #6. Refugees Resettled in the 0.5., as a reflectitage of the ceiling	
TARGETS	FY 2006	100%; Number to be set by the President in FY 2005.	
TAR	FY 2005	100%; Number to be set by the President in FY 2004.	
	2004	106%; 52,868 refugees were resettled in the U.S. of the allocated ceiling of 50,000 refugees.	
LTS	2003	Out of a ceiling of 70,000 refugees, 28,422 (or forty-one percent) were resettled.	
RESULTS	2002	Out of a ceiling of 70,000 refugees, 27,113 were resettled. This number was significantly affected by developments since the events of 9/11.	
	2001	Baseline: As a percentage of the established ceiling, 87% of refugees were resettled.	
DATA UALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator measures the effectiveness of the refugee admissions program overall. To the extent that Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) has control of the process, it also measures PRM's performance in managing the program.	
DA QUA	Data Source	PRM's Refugee Processing Center collects data on refugees admitted to the U.S.	



	Indic	Efficiency Indicator Indicator #9: Total Average Cost per Refugee Arrival in the U.S.		
ETS	FY 2006	\$3,600		
TARGETS	FY 2005	\$3,700		
	2004	\$3,500		
RESULTS	2003	\$4,428		
RESI	2002	Baseline: \$4,445 per refugee arrival in the U.S.		
	2001	N/A		
TA LITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator measures the efficiency of the U.S. Refugee Program overall. Declining per capita costs reflect the Department's efforts to manage the program effectively and in the interests of U.S. taxpayers.		
DA	Data Source	The Department tracks program costs; the Department's Refugee Processing Center collects data on refugee arrivals in the U.S.		

# I/P #3: Humanitarian Mine Action (PART Program)

Expand U.S. influence by demonstrating a strong commitment to humanitarian values, while taking practical steps to clear dangerous landmines and build strong public-private partnerships that serve to promote the USG's humanitarian efforts.



#### **Output Indicator**

Indicator #10: Percentage of Countries Meeting Targets for Square Meters of Land Cleared as Defined in Their Country Plans

GETS	FY 2006	85%
TARGETS	FY 2005	85%
	2004	85% on target
RESULTS	2003	Revised indicator in FY 2004 - result for previous indicator was 103,319,920 m <sup>2</sup>
	2002	82,500,000 m <sup>2</sup>
	2001	211,000,000 m <sup>2</sup> /1.3 billion km <sup>2</sup>
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Land returned to productive use measures the additional space that post-conflict societies can rebuild in safety. It is a primary indicator of success because it signifies progress toward the end goal of a country being mine-safe.
	Data Source	NGOs, host nations, and contractor partners provide data on land cleared.





### **Output Indicator**

Indicator #11: Percentage of Countries Targeted for End State\* in 2009 That Are Meeting All Capacity-Building Targets as Defined in Their Country Plans

	Meeting All Capacity-building rargets as Defined in Their Country Plans				
TARGETS	FY 2006	85%			
TAR	FY 2005	80%			
RESULTS	2004	Baseline: 75%			
	2003-2001	N/A			
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Countries are able to manage their indigenous humanitarian mine action program as determined in their country plan.			
	Data Source	Data will be collected from implementing partners and analyzed to determine if the country plans' targets for capacity building are being met.			

<sup>\*</sup> A cumulative indicator. End state refers to when a country has eliminated the most pressing humanitarian impacts and has the capacity to address those that remain with little or no external funding.

Outcome Indicator					
27311	Indicator #12: Number of U.S. Program Countries in Sustainment or End State*				
TARGETS	FY 2006 17				
TARG	FY 2005	15 out of 33 program countries (33 is a target number for FY 2005)			
	2004	13 significantly below target			
JLTS	2003	12 slightly below target			
RESULTS	2002	9			
	2001	7			
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The number of countries that are managing or have solved their landmine problem determines the overall success of the humanitarian demining program goal of reaching a mine-safe world.			
	Data Source	Sustainment and end state status are determined by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs/WRA in consultation with posts.			
* A cumulative indicator. End state refers to when a country has eliminated the most pressing humanitarian impacts and has					

the capacity to address those that remain with little or no external funding.



	Efficiency Indicator				
	Indicator #13: Countries Reaching Sustainment of End State/ Cumulative Budget Authority				
SETS	FY 2006	<ol> <li>1. 19 countries</li> <li>2. \$599 million</li> <li>3. Measure: 3.2</li> </ol>			
TARGETS	FY 2005	<ol> <li>1. 18 countries</li> <li>2. \$519 million</li> <li>3. Measure: 3.5</li> </ol>			
	2004	<ol> <li>1. 17 countries</li> <li>2. \$449 million</li> <li>3. Measure: 3.8</li> </ol>			
LTS	2003	<ol> <li>1. 12 countries</li> <li>2. \$328 million</li> <li>3. Measure: 3.7</li> </ol>			
RESULTS	2002	<ol> <li>9 countries</li> <li>\$258 million</li> <li>Measure: 3.4</li> </ol>			
	2001	Baselines: 1. 7 countries 2. \$218 million 3. Measure: 3.2			
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This ratio measures the efficiency of the Demining Sustainment program. The efficiency is captured as a result of more countries graduating compared to any funding increases, proportionately. The seemingly slow initial results exist partially because the larger, more mine-intensive countries were the ones that were selected to start the program. As the program progresses, smaller countries or those with smaller problems are incorporated, leading to more countries reaching sustainment level quickly. One cannot divide the budget by the number of countries reaching Sustainment and come up with a per country cost as that is not a meaningful measure.			
DAT	Data Source	Sustainment and end state status are determined by PM/WRA in consultation with posts. Funding levels provided are total used to date or projected for use in humanitarian mine action programs.			





# I/P #4: World Food Program Donor Base

Coordinate humanitarian assistance and head off actions contrary to U.S. foreign policy objectives.



#### **Output Indicator**

Indicator #14: Strength of the World Food Program (WFP) Donor Base					
TARGETS	FY 2006	<ol> <li>WFP has sufficient funds to carry out its work, with contributions from many donor countries and the private sector.</li> <li>Number of donors to WFP increased by three.</li> <li>Non-U.S. contributions increased to more than 50% of total.</li> </ol>			
TAR	FY 2005	<ol> <li>WFP should have sufficient funds to carry out its work, with contributions from many donor countries and the private sector.</li> <li>Number of donors to WFP increased by three, and non-U.S. contributions increased to more than 50% of total.</li> </ol>			
	2004	As of October 4, 2004, there were seven new donors to WFP—Madagascar, Guatemala, Ecuador, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe. New donors were defined as those that did not contribute in 2002 or 2003. As of October 4, 2004, WFP had received \$1.562 billion in contributions, of which \$718 million were from the United States. Non-USG contributions were 54% of total contributions.			
RESULTS	2003	<ol> <li>WFP had nine new donors. "New donors" are defined as those that did not contribute in either 2002 or 2001. They are: Cameroon, El Salvador, Greece, Kuwait, Malta, Marshall Islands, Qatar, Russia, and Vietnam.</li> <li>Non-USG contributions to WFP totaled \$877 million, compared to \$871 million as of 12/31/2002. This was an increase of 0.7% (short of the 4% target).</li> </ol>			
	2002	Baseline: Of the \$1.8 billion, U.S. contributions were 52% and non-U.S. contributions were 48%.			
	2001	N/A			
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	WFP is a generally well-run organization, but its effectiveness can be compromised by over-reliance on U.S. contributions. More contributors and greater contributions from existing contributors are needed to keep WFP's crisis response capacity at its current level.			
	Data Source	Documents prepared by WFP for the Executive Board's annual session in May 2004.			



# I/P #5: Partner Accountability

Develop more formalized agreements with our partners to ensure accountability and mutual progress toward achieving stated goals.



### **Output Indicator**

Indicator #15: Percentage of International Organization and NGO Partners
That Take Corrective Action Within One Year of Receiving
Negative Findings in Financial Audits

SETS	FY 2006	96% of our partners have taken corrective action in response to any negative findings in financial audits conducted of their organizations.		
TARGETS	FY 2005	95% of our partners have taken corrective action in response to any negative findings in financial audits conducted of their organizations.		
S	2004	95% of our partners have taken corrective action in response to any negative findings in financial audits conducted of their organizations.		
RESULTS	2003	95% of our partners have taken corrective action in response to any negative findings in financial audits conducted of their organizations.		
æ	2002-2001	N/A		
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Financial transparency is essential to ensuring responsible programming.		
	Data Source	Financial audit reports of the Department's partner organizations.		





#### **Annual Performance Goal #2**

IMPROVE DISASTER PREVENTION AND RESPONSE THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING IN CRISIS-PRONE COUNTRIES.

# I/P #6: Capacity Building

Ensure that partners have the appropriate training and support to build local capacity in disaster preparedness and mitigation.



#### **Outcome Indicator**

# Indicator #1: Number of People and Number/Percent of Partner Institutions That Received Training and Technical Support

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TARGETS	FY 2006	<ol> <li>Number of People that received training &amp; technical support: 385,200</li> <li>Number of Partner Institutions that received training &amp; technical support: 904</li> <li>Average Percent of USAID Partner Institutions that received training &amp; technical support: 40%</li> </ol>
TAR	FY 2005	<ol> <li>Number of People that received training &amp; technical support: 335,150</li> <li>Number of Partner Institutions that received training &amp; technical support: 897</li> <li>Average Percent of USAID Partner Institutions that received training &amp; technical support: 40%</li> </ol>
ГЅ	2004	Number of People that received training & technical support: 294,041     Number of Partner Institutions that received training & technical support: 862     Average Percent of USAID Partner Institutions that received training & technical support: 33%
RESULTS	2003	N/A
	2002-2001	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	USAID undertakes training and technical support to local institutions to build capacity in disaster preparedness and mitigation. This will aggregate the total support provided by all operating units - DCHA and USAID Missions.
	Data Source	USAID Annual Reports from Operating Units.

#### **Outcome Indicator**

Indicator #2: Number/Percent of Crisis-Prone Countries That Have Systems to Warn about Shocks and Their Effects on Food Availability/Access by Vulnerable People

to wa	to Warn about Shocks and Their Effects on Food Availability/Access by Vulnerable People				
TARGETS	FY 2006	12 (60%) of USAID-assisted, crisis prone countries have systems to warn of shocks.			
TAR	FY 2005	11 (55%) of USAID-assisted, crisis prone countries have systems to warn of shocks.			
S	2004	First year of data collection. Nine (45%) of USAID-assisted, crisis prone countries have systems to warn of shocks.			
RESULTS	2003	N/A			
	2002-2001	N/A			
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This is an important first step and good indicator towards reducing vulnerabilities to disasters and building capacity to anticipate and respond appropriately.			
	Data Source	FEWSNET monitoring reports.			



FY 2006 28,525 buildings (homes, schools, clinics, markets) reconstructed or FY 2005 80,000 buildings (homes, schools, clinics, markets) reconstructed or		28,525 buildings (homes, schools, clinics, markets) reconstructed or rehabilitated.		
TAR	FY 2005	80,000 buildings (homes, schools, clinics, markets) reconstructed or rehabilitated.		
S	2004	First year of data collection. 41,577 buildings (homes, schools, clinics, markets) reconstructed or rehabilitated.		
RESULTS	2003	N/A		
RE	2002-2001	N/A		
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	USAID provides significant support to reconstruction and rehabilitation. This is a good objectively verifiable indicator of communities/societies being rebuilt after a crisis.		
DA	Data Source	USAID Annual Reports from Operating Units; Implementing partner reports.		

# V. Illustrative Examples of FY 2004 Achievements

Humanitarian Response				
Humanitarian Demining  In FY 2004, approximately 24 mine-affected countries in the U.S. Huma Demining Program benefited from the clearance of land and infrastruct process restored food production, livelihoods, key transportation corrid importantly, a sense of public safety. These countries also witnessed to of tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) countries, mine action also served as a vital tool of engagement, suppo building initiatives and demonstrating U.S. resolve to protect victims of				
Refugee Admissions to the U.S.	In 2004, over 50,000 refugees arrived in the U.S for resettlement, exceeding the regionally allocated ceiling established by the President. This level of admissions represents an 86% increase over last year's admissions total. The United States admitted fewer than 30,000 refugees in 2002 and 2003 as a result of security concerns and program changes necessitated by the events of 9/11 as well as changes in the composition of the refugee population. This year's achievement reflects significant effort, resources and coordination among program partners - both inside and outside government. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services have worked closely to overcome obstacles in refugee admissions processing.			
Response to Humanitarian Crisis in Chad and Darfur	The USG has led the international response to the humanitarian emergency resulting from the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Working closely together, the Department and USAID have provided over \$200 million in FY 2004 to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of 200,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad and 1.6 million internally displaced persons in Darfur. The Department and USAID are actively engaged with multilateral and non-governmental organizations to ensure strong management of assistance programs under challenging conditions. The USG is also a leading advocate for the protection of civilians affected by the conflict. To strengthen our response, the Department and USAID continue to deploy staff to the region - on diplomatic missions, extended monitoring missions, and a Disaster Assistance Response Team.			





# VI. Resource Detail

Table 1: State Appropriations by Bureau (\$ Thousands)

Bureau	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
Western Hemisphere Affairs	\$45,276	\$46,520	\$49,066
African Affairs	11,608	12,156	12,008
European and Eurasian Affairs	5,874	5,910	5,910
Political-Military Affairs	4,151	4,226	4,341
Other Bureaus	8,948	8,688	9,319
Total State Appropriations	\$75,857	\$77,500	\$80,644

Table 2: Foreign Operations by Account (\$ Thousands)

Title/Accounts	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
Export-Import Bank			
Overseas Private Investment			
Corporation Trade and Development Agency	1,491	1,533	1,467
	<u> </u>		
USAID	153,460	97,600	34,737
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative			
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance	610,547	542,962	691,163
Independent Agencies	1,858	1,885	1,885
Department of State	851,878	848,825	1,000,770
Department of Treasury			
Conflict Response Fund			
Millennium Challenge Account			
International Military Education and Training	349	320	190
Foreign Military Financing	1,032	5,800	0
Peacekeeping Operations	9,219	21,301	23,496
International Development Association			
International Financial Institutions			
International Organizations and Programs	0	0	600
Total Foreign Operations	\$1,629,834	\$1,520,226	\$1,754,308
Grand Total	\$1,705,691	\$1,597,726	\$1,834,952
Grand Total	31,700,091	31,377,720	۶۱,03 <del>4</del> ,732